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A lesser-known aspect of globalisation is the phenomenon of 
international migration, which now presents some of the most 
complex policy concerns as it increasingly affects individuals, 
communities, and countries. Estimates put the number of people 
currently residing outside of their country of birth at 191 million 
persons (2005) --roughly 3% of the world population, or 1 in every 
35 persons. An impetus to the movement of people across 
boundaries comes from a looming imbalance in global labour 
markets that exerts both push and pulls factors for migration. 
Most industrialized countries have declining population at a time 
when the population of developing countries is rapidly 
expanding. 
1 
As a result, the dependency ratio--the ratio of non-
working age population to working age population-- is rising in 
most industrialized countries while it is falling in developing 
countries. Consequently, Remittances, which are a reverse flow 
of migration, are expected to be with us for a long time. 
Governments in developing and developed countries have seized 
on the growing importance of migration to find ways of 
harnessing the development potential of migration and the 
associated flow of remittances to support the developmental 
needs of poor Countries. 
 
Remittances are the portion of international migrant workers’ 
earnings sent back from the country of employment to the 
country of origin.  Most remittances are relatively small sums 
sent home often, to support family members, build savings, 
invest in a business, or repay a debt. While each remittance is 
small, remittances are a notable component of the international 
flow of funds because of the large number of remitters and the 
frequency with which they send monies. Measured amounts of 
remittances are reported in the international transaction of 
countries. Member countries of the International Monetary Fund 
are required to report their Balance of payments. Although the 
concept of remittances varies by the intended use of the 
information, remittances involve certain transactions that are 
initiated by individuals living or working outside their country of 
                                                 
1
 Even for the United States, which has sustained a growing population base thru immigration, the 
population transition is expected to occur by 2010. 
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birth or origin and related to their migration. The components of 
balance of payments statistics that have been specifically 
mentioned in this context are: 
• Compensation of employees –i.e., wages, salaries, and 
other benefits earned by Individuals, in economies other 
than those in which they are residents. Since residency is 
broadly recognized as staying in location (legally or 
illegally) for at least one year,  this applies only to  persons 
expected to return to their countries of birth after being 
away from it for less than a year and; 
• Personal remittances-- current transfers, often between 
related persons, by migrants
2
 who are in new economies 
and considered residents there;  
• Migrants’ transfers –changes in the capital account caused 
by the change of residence of a household.  
The notion of remittances can, thus, vary depending on which of 
these three components are used.
3
 The World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, for example, use differing 
definitions of remittances.
4
  
 
Remittances to developing countries are booming. International 
remittances received by developing countries reached $167 
billion in 2005. They have doubled in volume the past five years 
due to increased scrutiny of flows since 9/11, changes in the 
industry that supports the flow of remittances (lower costs), 
improvements in data recording, the relative depreciation of the 
dollar, and growth in the number of migrants and their incomes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 A migrant is a person who comes to an economy and stays there, or is expected to stay, 
for a year or more. 
3
 In the balance of payments framework of international transactions although both Compensation of 
employees and Workers’ remittances are part of the current account, compensation of employees is a 
component of income while workers’ remittance is a component of current transfers. However, migrant 
transfers are component of the capital account. 
4
 The World Bank uses all three components while the IMF and most researchers of the subject exclude 
Migrants’ transfers from their definition.  
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Figure 1: Global Remittance Outflows 
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Source: World Bank, Remittances here are defined as the sum of Workers’ remittances, 
compensation of employees, and migrant transfers 
 
In developing countries, the growth in remittance exceeds 
growth in any other financial inflow including official 
development Assistance (ODA). Remittances are now more than 
twice ODA flows to developing countries.  According to the World 
Bank, recorded remittances are larger than 10% of GDP in 20 
largest recipients, Capital flows in 36 developing countries, 
Merchandise exports in 9 countries, largest single commodity 
exports in 28 countries.Their impacts on specific economies can 
be seen from the fact that remittances brought in more than 
Mexico's oil industry in 2005, coffee exports in Brazil, tea exports 
in Sri Lanka, or tourism in Morocco. In Jordan, Lesotho, 
Nicaragua, Tonga and Tajikistan, they provide more than a 
quarter of the gross national product. A recent report by the US 
General Accountability Office highlighting the importance of 
remittances to persons that do receive remittances from the US 
shows that the average monthly transfer was equivalent to 3 
times the prevailing monthly minimum wage in all developing 
countries that have minimum wage regulations, 5 times the 
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monthly minimum wage in Low income developing countries; at 
least 7 times the monthly minimum wage in China, Ghana, Haiti, 
Laos, Russia & Sri Lanka; and 4 to 6 times the monthly minimum 
wage in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El 
Salvador, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Philippines, and Syria.
5
 
 
Certain characteristics of remittance flows such as their volume, 
stable growth over time, and anti-cyclical nature i.e. they 
increase in times of economic slowdowns and hardships in the 
countries of birth while increasing during economic upturns in 
the host countries, indicate that they hold great promise as a 
source of development finance.
6
   
Remittances positively impact the current account by providing 
both foreign exchange and additional savings for economic 
development.  With remittances, an economy can spend more 
than it produces, import more than it exports or invest more than 
it saves.
7
 As a source of development finance, remittances also 
have some distinct advantages because unlike development 
loans, they do not come with a liability to pay; they are sent 
directly to the people for whom they are intended. Since 
remittances are sent from after tax income of dislocated and 
typically poor migrants, they add a personal dimension to the aid 
given by more developed countries and have been referred by 
some as  “Private aid from the poor in more developed settings to 
the poorer in less developed settings”.  
 
The down side of remittances in the development process, on the 
other hand, is that remittances may undermine prospects for 
development by perpetuating an economic dependency. For 
example, like many unearned wealth, they may encourage 
idleness among those who receive them; intensify a continuing 
                                                 
5
 Report to the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,  “International Remittance: 
Different Estimation Methodologies Produce Different Results”, GAO-06-210, march 2006 (the Author of 
this paper was senior economist on the GAO assignment)_ 
6
 Rremittance flows appear to be less vulnerable to economic cycles than other sources of 
external funding to developing countries such as foreign direct investment or even 
official development assistance.  . 
7
  This might even be more relevant for small economies (Connell and Conway 2000). 
 6 
trend of migration of working age population. The remittance 
literature has shown their tendency to push up the value a 
nation’s currency leading to the so-called “Dutch disease” 
causing deterioration of an economy’s balance of payments 
position and specifically worsening the welfare of families not 
receiving remittances.
8
   
 
The following table summarizes the key pro and cons of 
remittances. 
 
Tables 1: A short Summary of PRO and CONS of remittances 
• Remittances offer a rare 
chance to accumulate 
savings 
• Reduced labor market 
pressures  
• Increase contacts with 
international markets and 
access to technology 
• Reduce poverty 
– Remittances have 
reduced the number 
of people who live 
below the poverty 
line in Uganda, 
Bangladesh and 
Ghana (World Bank ) 
• Countercyclical than 
other sources of income 
• Stable source of foreign 
exchange 
 
• Migrants can be subject 
to exploitation and abuse  
• Loss of skilled personnel 
through migration  
• Increase inequality 
– Cost of migration is 
high & the poorest 
can’t afford it 
• Cause appreciation of real 
exchange rates 
– Reduce export 
competitiveness 
• Increase wasteful 
consumption  
• Inflate real estate prices 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 See McCormick, B., and J. Wahba (2000). Overseas Employment and Remittances to a Dual Economy. 
The Economic Journal 110 (April): 509–534. 
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In spite of the remarkable upward trend in the volume of 
remittances, the very nature of remittances as person-to-person 
transnational exchange makes the measured and reported 
amounts of suspicious quality. The volume of remittances varies 
depending on the accuracy and reliability of the underlying 
information regarding financial exchanges between persons as 
well as the standard and definitions used by geographical 
entities.  Consequently, difficulties in identifying person-to-
person transactions and difficulties in identifying cross border 
transactions are critical in determining the accuracy of 
remittance flows. Information on remittances can be constrained 
by the need for reliable information such as the purpose, legality 
and motivation of the sender. Furthermore not all funds 
transferred by migrants can be recorded as remittances.  For 
example, In order to avoid confusion with export or import of 
services, the receiving individual may not perform a personal 
service in exchange for the amount received. Money remitted for 
the purpose of making a deposit in an account with a bank 
located abroad represents a financial investment and is therefore 
not a remittance and instead should be recorded as an 
investment asset of the sending economy because deposits in a 
bank involve a quid pro quo since the sending party acquires a 
claim against the deposit-taking bank abroad. 
Similarly, money remitted to purchase real estate or acquire 
control of a business ought to be treated as a form of investment, 
even in cases where family members in the country of origin live 
in the house or work in the business. Money transfers to 
nonresidents in the receiving country (students, medical 
patients, tourists, etc.) do not qualify as remittances because by 
definition no change of ownership between residents and 
nonresidents occurs.  In contrast, when, bank accounts of 
migrant residents are accessible by family members in the 
country of birth of the migrant (e.g., through ATM cards), 
withdrawals constitute a remittance. It is however very unlikely 
such transactions are accurately recorded. A more glaring 
omission in remittance accounting is the physical movements of 
goods across borders. Travelers visiting their home countries 
routinely take personal effects (or cash) with them; these are not 
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classified as exports in their country of residence or as imports 
in their home country. However, often these goods are 
subsequently given as gifts to relatives and are no different than 
money transfers from outside the home countries. It is however 
unlikely such transactions are sufficiently covered by customs 
data. Remittances in goods could be substantial omission in 
accounting for of remittances especially where large migrant 
flows occur, and where migrants can travel overland between 
their countries of origin and residence, such as Mexicans 
traveling from the United States. 
 
An additional layer of the problem of the reliability of reported 
remittances flows comes from differences in national reporting 
systems, lack of source data, and lack of resources in receiving 
countries which collectively add uncertainty to officially reported 
data. Data on remittances is inconsistent, resulting in official 
estimates that vary in quality and coverage. Although the IMF 
has the responsibility of collecting individual country statistics 
on the balance of payments, it does not evaluate the accuracy of 
figures its member countries report. Despite developing a non-
prescriptive data compilation guide for the preparation of the 
Balance of Payments including estimation of remittances, the 
IMF accepts any countries reported data at its face value.
9
 This 
is in part because the IMF believes no method of estimating 
remittances is perfect, estimates using household surveys; 
estimates using intermediaries such as money transmissions 
businesses as well as model-based estimates each have their 
drawbacks. The choice of which method to employ is basically 
related to availability of resources. Variations in data compilation 
procedures occur partially due to different interpretations of 
definitions and classifications.
10
 In most cases, however, data 
weaknesses and omissions are due to the difficulties in obtaining 
all necessary data. Furthermore, explanation of data on 
                                                 
9
 The IMF published its fifth edition of its Balance of Payments Manual in 1993. to guide countries in 
compiling balance of payment statistics 
10
 For example, some countries consider nationals working abroad for a year and longer as residents—and 
their earnings therefore as compensation of employees—because they maintain strong linkages with their 
home country. Most countries follow the one-year rule. 
 9 
remittances submitted by member countries does not reveal 
methodologies used for obtaining the remittance figures. Most 
countries simply report whatever comes out of central bank 
reports. Most countries report their remittances as residuals of 
existing data, others simply do not report on remittances.  For 
countries that use estimates to report to the IMF, the accuracy 
of their reported data cannot be measured in a goodness of fit 
test. Further more, remittance estimates are not always reported 
by countries, or not reported according to definitions.
11
 In 
resource rich countries, which are also key source countries for 
remittances, remittances are but a tiny component of over all 
international economic transactions that may not merit 
specialized focus. For instance, the United States, reputedly the 
largest remittance source country, has no US government 
agency to track remittances. Instead, the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) makes estimates for Balance of payment 
purposes.
12
   
 
Yet another problem in reported remittances arises 
from the channels through which remittance are 
transferred internationally.  Remittances flow in both 
formal & informal channels. While it is easier to collect 
information on formal channels (such as banks and 
other licensed money transfer establishments), they 
tend to be hampered by financial illiteracy & 
institutional underdevelopment in developing countries. 
They may also suffer from difficulties in separating remittance 
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 For example, the World Bank reported fewer than two billion dollars in remittances to the Philippines in 
2002, but the Philippines’ central bank reported over six billion (BSP 2002). Second, remittances are often 
not reported at all. In Guyana, for example, whose Diaspora is almost as large as its country’s population 
(there are 700,000 Guyanese in Guyana and over half a million abroad), remittances represent at least 10% 
of the country’s GDP. However, this data is not available anywhere. [OROZCO Worker Remittances: An 
International Comparison] 
 
12
 BEA reports in table 1, line 38 of the standard presentation of the U.S. international transactions accounts 
estimates of personal transfers by the foreign-born population resident in the United States to households 
abroad. The figure reported is called “Private remittances and other transfers”. Line 38 is consequently 
more than the international definition of Workers’ remittances; it includes payments or receipts of non-
governmental U.S. entities and foreign entities. Also, BEA publishes its estimates of Private remittances 
and other transfers as the difference between transfers to and transfers from the United States. 
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flows from other payment flows. In contrast, informal channels 
are obstacles to accuracy of measurement but address senders’ 
needs efficiently and reliably. As a result, 91 percent of global 
money transfers occur outside the banking systems. According 
to the World Bank, current reported amounts may have to be 
adjusted upwards by as much as 50-percent for a more accurate 
volume of global remittances.   
 
An international effort to improve remittance data is however 
under way. Furthermore, the growing interest in remittance flows 
is pressuring some countries to pay special attention to their 
information on remittances. Recent international efforts have 
highlighted the need for more reliable data on remittance. The 
Sea Island Summit of G8 countries called for countries to work 
with international agencies and others to improve data. This 
message was reiterated by the G7 Finance Ministers who called 
for the creation of an international working group, lead by the 
World Bank, which would be responsible for (i) clarifying the 
concepts and definition of remittances; and (ii) providing better 
guidance on data collection with the objective of improving 
bilateral estimates. The task force identified three priorities 
beginning with improving aggregate estimates, improving 
estimates of flows between countries because reported 
information on remittances does not provide partner detail, and 
improving data that may be obtained from household surveys. 
 
One consequence of the problem of measuring remittances thru 
formal and informal channels has led to attempts to capture both 
by relying on generalized assumptions on remittance behaviors 
of sending and receiving individuals instead of tracking flows 
though undeveloped formal and hard to observe informal 
channels. The methodology relies on regular demographic data, 
and occasional surveys of senders /receivers to obtain key 
parameters such as the likelihood to send/receive remittances 
(percent of population), propensity to send/receive remittances 
(percent of income), and or average per capita remittance 
sent/received. In this methodology, remittances are estimates 
from average behavior of migrant/ recipient individuals. 
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Consequently, The accuracy of the estimated amounts depends 
on the care taken in estimating the above parameters, the 
accuracy of the demographic data, and the reliability of sample 
surveys of senders/receivers. Many countries, including the 
United States use this methodology.  
  
The Official Remittance Estimate of the US 
 
The BEA officially estimated remittances from the US at $ 55 
billion for 2005 and includes components that are not normally 
included in standard remittance reporting. The equivalent 
standardized figure, as reported to the IMF, is  $XX billion. The 
estimate is derived from country-by-country tabulations of 140 
countries. The value is obtained from a simple calculation that 
relies estimates of the propensity to remit (percentage of 
income) of the foreign born in the United States, their likelihood 
to remit (percent of the foreign born that remit). The basic tenet 
of the methodology is that remittances are proportional to 
income; some foreign born remit some don’t depending on their 
household and family obligations in their countries of birth and in 
the United States.  The latter is further approximated by various 
variables such as their duration of stay in the US, 
presence/absence of children in their US household; and 
Presence/absence of spouses in the US. The BEA also assumes 
the propensities to remit the proportions of the foreign born that 
remit vary by the development level of countries of birth, 
grouping countries of origin into four tiers 
13
The BEA obtains 
annual data on the number of foreign born in the US and their 
personal income from annual surveys of the foreign born in the 
United States. Figure 1., below, explains the methodology 
employed by the BEA to obtain official remittances from the 
United States.  
 
Figure 2: The methodology of estimating Official Remittances 
from the United States 
                                                 
13
 See Survey of Current Business, July 1005 
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BEA does not breakdown its annual remittance estimates by 
Countries of birth because, it lacks confidence in its country-
level estimates
14
.  Because Mexico is considered a major trading 
partner, comparisons can be made with official Mexican data. 
BEA estimated remittances to Mexico at $8.9 billion, in 2003. 
Mexico--which gets nearly all of its remittances from the US-- 
published its remittance inflow at $13.4 billion for 2003. As a 
point of comparison, The Inter American Development Bank (IDB) 
also makes estimates for its members. For 2003, the IDB 
estimated remittances to Mexico at $12.9 billion Furthermore, 
IDB’s estimates for 21 Latin American member countries was   
$30.6 billion, compared to BEA’s estimates of $17.9 billion. This 
apparent discrepancy between estimates of the BEA , the 
Mexican and IDB estimates not only reflects differences in 
concepts of remittance flows but also in the choice of 
                                                 
14
 Only Publishes Balance of payments data for major trading partners (e.g. the European 
Union, Canada, etc.), which are quite different than major remittance destinations.  
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parameters in the estimation methodology. Unfortunately, the 
discrepancy cannot be resolved as the true amount remitted is 
essentially unobservable. 
 
 
 
Modeling the Remitting Behavior of the Foreign born In the 
United States 
 
Our model of remittance begins with the assumption that the 
individual is altruistic in such a way that his/her utility is 
maximized not only from variables that increase his/her 
consumption but also from those of his/her closest relatives.  A 
direct outcome of this assumption leads to a supply function for 
remittances that includes income, the probability of being a 
remittance sender, and the amount of income to be remitted. 
This altruistic preference maximization can be shown to depend 
on two separate decisions: the likelihood that an individual will 
be a remitter and the proportion of his/her income to be remitted. 
The remittance literature typically shows that income, the 
income and distance difference between the place of birth and 
the adopted place of residence, the influence of integration into 
the host economy, and the residual influence of the place of birth 
determine the two decisions. 
 
The remittance literature has shown: 
 
 Remittance increases relative to personal income. The rate 
at which remittances increase relative to income, however, 
may be variable. 
 The longer individuals are away from their places of birth 
the less likely they are to send remittances. Remittances 
therefore are expected to decay as immigrants are 
gradually integrated into the host economy.  
 Remittances are generally made only by the foreign-born. 
Furthermore, remittance behavior is not likely to be 
inherited, thus implying that children of remitters are not 
likely to be remitters. 
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 More responsibilities in the host country (children, 
marriage, property ownership, etc.) reduce both the 
likelihood of being a remitter and the amount remitted. 
 More responsibilities in the place of birth (non-migrating 
relatives and spouses, etc.) increase both the likelihood of 
being a remitter and the amount remitted. 
 The amount to remit as well as the likelihood of being a 
remitter is proportional to the difference in the average 
income and physical distance between the host cost 
countries and the place of birth.  In the United States, for 
instance, immigrants from Central American and Caribbean 
nations have been shown to be more likely to remit than 
individuals from other nations of equal economic stature. 
Consequently, places of birth can be grouped by their 
relative distance and average income gaps from the host 
countries.  
 
In our model, we use the number of years away from ones place 
of birth, the presence or absence of children in the household in 
the host country, and the presence or absence of spouses, as 
indicators of integration into the host economy or affinity to the 
home country.  Personal income in the host country is used as a 
factor in explaining both the likelihood of being remitter and the 
amount to be remitted. We also use four country groupings to 
distinguish remittance behaviors by places of birth. Data on the 
foreign-born in the United States forms the universe of our 
empirical analysis. 
 
Data on the remitting characteristics of the foreign born is 
difficult to obtain because the target population is not only hard 
to survey but also because they have reasons to not be 
forthcoming with truthful answers, they have linguistic 
difficulties, they fear hostile actions by host governments. Data 
on the remitting characteristics of the foreign born in the United 
states is rare as there is only one survey that attempted to get 
information on all foreign born in the United States.
15
 There are 
                                                 
15
 The legalized Population Survey (LPS1), 1989 and the follow-up survey (LPSII), 1991 
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however, less universal surveys that collected information on a 
regional basis, such as surveys of Mexicans in the US, surveys of 
Hispanics in the US. Although a more recent survey would have 
been appropriate for estimating the parameters of our model, we 
believe the LPS I and II still provide acceptable parameter 
estimates so long as the current immigrant profile is not 
profoundly different from those at the time of the survey. This 
said, we appeal to all to urge a survey of Ethiopians in the United 
States for a more accurate estimate of remittances from the 
United States.  
 
We used data from LPS1 to obtain an empirical application of our 
model. We derived an estimate of the percent of the foreign born 
that remit using a logistic regression . The results of the 
regression are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Logistic Regression of Percent of Foreign Born that 
Remit 
 
 
Coefficie
nts 
Std. 
Error  
Log 
odds 
ratio 
Intercept -0.685 0.245 ** 0.504 
Males 0.072 0.067  1.075 
Children not present in US 
Household 0.260 0.061 ** 1.297 
Married and spouse not in US 1.008 0.155 ** 2.741 
Years in US -0.088 0.008 ** 0.916 
Income
1 
  **  
 No income reported -1.122 0.194 ** 0.326 
 $2,999 or less -0.600 0.201 ** 0.549 
 $3,000 - $5,999 -0.169 0.196  0.845 
 $6,000 - $8,999 0.015 0.186  1.015 
 $9,000 - $11,999 -0.076 0.184  0.927 
 $12,000 - $14,999 0.128 0.186  1.137 
 $15,000 - $19,999 0.115 0.188  1.122 
 $20,000 - $24,999 0.177 0.208  1.193 
 $25,000 - $29,999 0.116 0.249  1.123 
Tiers   **  
Countries near the US 2.064 0.176 ** 7.879 
 16 
Other poor developing 
countries 1.350 0.195 ** 3.859 
Middle Income Countries 0.561 0.206 ** 1.752 
     
** 99% significance 
* 95% significance 
-2 Log likelihood = 7,177 
N                        = 5,895 
1 
/ income levels shown are for 1989-90 which can be adjusted by the cost of 
living for more current levels assuming that basic remitting behaviors do not 
change in time. Also, the category of “no income reported” is included 
because the data contains information on some individuals that did not state 
their income but reported their remittances.   
.   
As can be seen from table, 1, our estimates show that: 
 Males are approximately 7.5 percent more likely to remit 
than females,  
 Individuals that have children in the US are 1.3 times less 
likely to be remitters than individuals that do not have 
children in the US  
 Individuals that have left their spouse behind in the host 
country are 2.7 times more likely to remit than individuals 
who have their spouses in the U.S. or are unmarried   
 Compared to individuals from well-developed nations, 
individuals from close by nations (e.g. Mexico, etc) are 8 
times more likely to remit and individuals from poor 
developing countries (e.g. Ethiopia) are only 4 times as 
likely to be remitters. 
 Each year in the United States decreases the likelihood of 
being a remitter by approximately 9-percent. 
 Although personal income is significant in explaining the 
likelihood of being a remitter, differences in income are 
generally not significant. 
We also made a second estimate that took into account the 
results in table 2. The regression results of our second 
experiment are shown in Table 2.a., below. 
 
Table 2.a: Regression of the percent of the foreign born that 
remit 
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PUT TABLE OF NEW REGRESSION HERE and explain 
 
 Coefficients 
Std. 
Error  
Log odds 
ratio 
Males 0.15 0.02 ** 1.2 
Children not 
present in US 
Household 0.09 0.02 ** 1.1 
Years in the US   **  
    <= 5.00 -0.02 0.04  1.0 
     6.00 - 10.00 -0.10 0.02 ** 0.9 
    11.00 - 15.00 -0.35 0.03 ** 0.7 
    16.00 - 20.00 -0.62 0.04 ** 0.5 
Married and 
spouse not in US 0.89 0.04 ** 2.4 
 
 
Our revised estimates of the percent of foreign born that remit 
shoed that males are 20-percent more likely to be remitters than 
Females, that foreign born that do not have children with them 
are 10-percent more likely to remit than those who do not, those 
who do not have their spouses are about 2-1/2/ times more likely 
to be remitters than those that either have their spouses with 
them or are unmarried. As expected, staying in the US longer 
reduces the probability of being a remitter. 
 
In table 3, a summary of the results in the regression is shown 
for individuals from poor developing countries. 
 
Table 3: Estimated Percent of Foreign Born that Remit by Years 
in the United States for Low income Developing Countries 
 
 Males Females 
 
Child Not present 
in US household 
Child present in 
US household 
Child Not present 
in US household 
Child present in 
US household 
Years in the 
US 
Spouse 
outside 
the US 
Unmarri
ed or 
spouse 
in the 
US 
Spouse 
outside 
the US 
Unmarri
ed or 
spouse 
in the 
US 
Spouse 
outside 
the US 
Unmarri
ed or 
spouse 
in the 
US 
Spouse 
outside 
the US 
Unmarri
ed or 
spouse 
in the 
US 
<= 5.00 78% 55% 72% 53% 73% 52% 74% 49% 
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6.00 - 10.00 73% 53% 69% 51% 71% 50% 69% 47% 
11.00 - 15.00 68% 47% 66% 45% 65% 43% 62% 41% 
16.00 - 20.00 57% 40% 52% 38% 53% 37% 52% 35% 
21.00+ 47% 35% 40% 33% 42% 31% 44% 30% 
 
 
Our regression of the amount of remittance by the foreign-born in 
the United States resulted in estimates that conform to the 
expected (theoretical) results and considering the sample size 
we are working with, all coefficients were highly statistically 
significant.  Our results show that males tend to send $228 more 
than females per year, individuals whose do not have children in 
their US households send about $800 more than those who do. 
Individuals whose are married but have their spouse in their 
countries of birth send $1437 more than unmarried or married 
individuals who are in the US with their spouses. Also, each year 
in the U.S. tends to reduce the amount remitted by about $60 
dollars. Irrespective of their income level, individuals coming 
from countries in close proximity to the US on average send 
about $246 more compared to those from more developed 
countries of birth.  
 
 
Table4: Fixed effects Model Regression of Remittance Amounts 
 
 Coefficients Std. Error 
Intercept 2,753 39 ** 
Males 228 6 ** 
Children not present in US Household 807 5 ** 
Married and spouse not in US 1,437 9 ** 
Years in US -58 1 ** 
Income
1
    
 No income reported -1,767 20 ** 
 $2,999 or less -2,090 21 ** 
 $3,000 - $5,999 -1,609 20 ** 
 $6,000 - $8,999 -1,392 19 ** 
 $9,000 - $11,999 -1,196 19 ** 
 $12,000 - $14,999 -873 19 ** 
 $15,000 - $19,999 -1,012 19 ** 
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 $20,000 - $24,999 -831 21 ** 
 $25,000 - $29,999 -287 24 ** 
Tiers    
Countries near the US 246 35 ** 
Other poor developing countries -221 39 ** 
Middle Income Countries 243 43 ** 
** 99% significance 
Residual is weighted 
1 
/ income levels shown are for 1989-90 which can be adjusted by the cost of 
living for more current levels assuming that basic remitting behaviors do not 
change in time. Also, the category of “no income reported” is included 
because the data contains information on some individuals that did not state 
their income but reported their remittances.   
 
 
As in Table 3.a, we also obtain estimates when years are 
grouped in ranges for individuals from poor developing countries.  
However, the dependent variable in this case is the percent of 
income remitted.  
 
Table4.a: Fixed effects Model Regression of percent of personal 
Income remitted 
 Coefficients Std. Error 
Intercept 2.74 1.26 ** 
Married and spouse not in US 5.20 0.25 ** 
Children not present in US Household] 1.70 0.13 ** 
Males -0.58 0.13 ** 
Years in the US   
    <= 5.00 0.54 1.30  
     6.00 - 10.00 4.72 1.26 ** 
    11.00 - 15.00 1.90 1.27  
    16.00 - 20.00 0.47 1.30  
** 99% significance 
 
Our revised estimate show that on average males remit about 7-
percent of their income, while women remit 8-percent, individual 
that do not have children in their US households remit also about 
8-percent of their income, individuals whose spouses are not in 
the United states remit 10-percent of their income compared to 
5-percent for individuals that are either unmarried or have their 
spouses with them in the US. Our results also show that there is 
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virtually no difference between the percentages of income 
remitted for individuals who have stayed in the US for less than 
five years and those who have been in the US for more than 16 
years-they both remit on average about 6-percent of their 
income. Remittances tend to be a significant portion of income 
(11-percent) for individuals who have been in the US for 6-10 
years. 
  
In Table 5, we present the predicted value of the proportion of 
personal income remitted for individuals from poor developing 
countries arrayed by years in the United States and the relevant 
variables in the above regression. 
 
Table 6: Estimated Percent of Income Remitted by Years in the 
United States for Low Income Developing Countries 
 Males Females 
 
Child Not present 
in US household 
Child present in 
US household 
Child Not present 
in US household 
Child present in 
US household 
Years in the 
US 
Spouse 
outside 
the US 
Unmarri
ed or 
spouse 
in the 
US 
Spouse 
outside 
the US 
Unmarri
ed or 
spouse 
in the 
US 
Spouse 
outside 
the US 
Unmarri
ed or 
spouse 
in the 
US 
Spouse 
outside 
the US 
Unmarri
ed or 
spouse 
in the 
US 
<= 5.00 10% 4% 8% 3% 10% 5% 8% 3% 
6.00 - 10.00 14% 9% 12% 7% 14% 9% 13% 7% 
11.00 - 15.00 11% 6% 9% 4% 12% 6% 10% 5% 
16.00 - 20.00 10% 4% 8% 3% 10% 5% 8% 3% 
21.00+ 9% 4% 7% 2% 10% 4% 8% 3% 
  
Applying Table 5 and Table 6  to the figures derived from the US 
census and the American Communities Survey on the number of 
the adult Former and current Ethiopians residing in the United 
States in 2000-2005, and their average personal income, we 
arrive at estimates of remittances to Ethiopia much more robust 
than what has been reported officially from the Government of 
Ethiopia.  
 
Figure 3 : Estimated remittances to Ethiopia from the United 
States 
 21 
$149
$101
$117
$100
$137
$155
$161
$173
$0
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 2007*
M
il
li
o
n
s
 
2006 & 2007 are predicted values 
 
We estimate that in 2005 remittances from the US alone were  
$155 million. While our estimate is only  $19 million less than the 
GOE figure of $174 million in 2005 from all sources, it is unlikely 
that Ethiopians outside the US could only have remitted such a 
low amount of just $19 million. Substantial numbers of Ethiopians 
now reside in Europe, the Middle East, Canada, and Australia all 
of which are prime remittance sending countries. It is therefore 
not unreasonable to expect remittance inflows from these 
regions to be much higher than the $19 million. The discrepancy 
between the GOE estimate and ours is therefore is fundamentally 
due to under estimation (overestimation) of the inherently 
unobservable remittance flow to Ethiopia.  
 
The latest official estimate of remittance inflows to Ethiopia from 
all sources, for example, was $174 million in 2005. As can be 
seen in figure 4, official GOE figures of remittance inflows to 
Ethiopia are erratic showing large growth in more recent years.  
The first explanation of the discrepancy between our estimate 
and that of the GOE is that the official estimates are badly 
understated. We pose the following arguments to support the 
notion that the GOE figures have historically tended to an under 
estimate the global remittance inflow to Ethiopia. The GOE 
figures, as reported to the International Monetary Fund, indicate 
that remittances were a mere $18 million in 2001 barely 10-
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percent of the GOE’s own estimate for 2005. The dramatic 
increase in the official estimate between 2001 and 2005 
suggests a profound change in the remittance behaviors of 
Ethiopians, yet, we are not aware of any fundamental factors 
that could cause it in the Ethiopian Diaspora. In addition, the 
2003 and 2004 estimates are even more perplexing. The official 
estimates show dramatic increases since 2003 suggesting that 
upward revisions may have been made. The official estimate for 
2003 was $47 million and in 2004 the official estimate shows a 
growth of $ 99 million (a growth rate of 190–percent in a single 
year) to $134 million. Furthermore, an unofficial estimate of 
remittances from the US by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
estimated remittances from the US at $83 million in 2003. It is 
therefore more plausible to expect that the official figure to be 
understated. 
 
Figure 4: GOE Official Global Inflows of remittances Compared to 
our Estimated remittances from the United States 
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Data on GOE estimates is from the World Bank and IMF 
2006 & 2007 are predicted values 
 
Alternatively, although we cannot claim that our estimates can 
not overstate remittances to Ethiopia, we argue that, given our 
methodology, overestimation can only happen if we are willing to 
accept that Ethiopians on average have a much lower propensity 
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to remit or that Ethiopians in the US are less likely to remit than 
their counter parts from others from equally underdeveloped 
nations or that GOE believes far fewer Ethiopians reside in the 
US than indicated by the yearly national US government sample 
surveys as well as the decennial census of 2000.  Over statement 
of the number of Ethiopians and their income in the US is, 
nevertheless, contradicted by the apparently large 
understatement of population counts and personal incomes 
among all US immigrant communities. It is therefore reasonable 
to assume immigrants, including those from Ethiopia, are 
generally under represented in the US Census and annual 
surveys.  
 
Remittances do have the potential to assist in the development 
nations like Ethiopia. There are also likely to continue as a 
source of external funds to support others sources of income to 
help in alleviating the massive poverty that has gripped Ethiopia. 
However, the importance of remittances in the development 
process of countries like Ethiopia needs proper attention from 
central governments who seem to have made little to 
accommodate and channel it. In fact, some have erected barriers 
to its effective use by attempting to tax remittance inflows and 
thereby drive the flow more underground. Alternatively, there are 
now countries that allow the granting of mortgages based on 
expected remittances. There are also countries that have a 
public policy of matching certain community-oriented 
remittances such as the building of schools and hospitals. 
Finally, astute governments in poor developing countries have 
begun to implement policies that reduce the financial cost and 
physical hardship of sending remittances.  More accurate 
information on remittances is a badly needed and is fundamental 
in evaluating the true impact of remittances and migration on the 
development process.   
